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I. Introduction

The Obama Administration’s (Adminstration) mandate
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 that
nearly all employers cover certain contraceptive drugs and
devices in any employee health plan (the Mandate)2 opened a new
front in the American abortion debate. Religious objectors charge
that coverage of six specific “abortion-inducing”3 drugs and
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at scattered sections of the Internal
Revenue Code and at 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 through May 1,
2010.
2. The ACA requires coverage “with respect to women, [of] such additional
preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services
Administration (‘HRSA’) for purposes of this paragraph.” See Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 1001 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300GG-13(a)(4) (2010)). The HRSA Guidelines recommended
coverage of “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive
methods [and] sterilization procedures.” See Women’s Preventive Services
Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands Prevention Coverage for Women’s
Health and Well-Being, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hrsa. gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Relying on the HRSA Guidelines, the
Administration finalized rules requiring coverage of “preventive care . . .
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by HRSA.” Interim Final
Rule on Preventive Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3,
2011); Final Rule on Preventive Services under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8724,
8725 (Feb. 15, 2012). The Mandate does not include drugs that are known to
work after implantation as chemical abortions, like RU-486. RU-486 is
marketed under the tradename “Korlym” and “Mifeprex.” Orange Book:
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (2013), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/Cder/ob/docs/temptn.
cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
For a synopsis of the Administration’s accommodations of religious non-profits,
see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Demagoguing Abortion (working title), in THE
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (Zoe Robinson, Micah Schwartzman & Chad
Flanders eds., forthcoming 2014) (on file with author). For penalties imposed on
objecting, non-exempt, for-profit employers if they drop all coverage, see Robin
Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion,
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1417, 1489–1505 (2012) [hereinafter Wilson, The Calculus].
3. Complaint at 6, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d. 102 (D.D.C.
July 18, 2012) (No. 1:12CV01169), http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/07/Wheaton-Complaint-timestamped.pdf; see also Birth Control:
Medicines to Help You, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/
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devices is tantamount to providing an “abortion on demand.”4 The
Administration and Mandate supporters insist that “drugs that
cause abortion are not covered by [the Mandate].”5 This firestorm
over such drugs and devices (together, emergency contraceptives
or EC) reverberates far outside the Washington Beltway, spilling
over to decisions facing women about whether to use EC after
“unanticipated sexual activity, contraceptive failure, or sexual
assault.”6
This Article explores how it is possible that such wildly
different claims can be made about the same drugs and devices,
claims that create real confusion for real women who are deciding
whether to use EC. It shows that both sides—Mandate
supporters and opponents, family planning advocates and
opponents of abortion—use conclusory labels to shorthand an
extraordinarily
complex
and
still-unfolding
scientific
understanding about how different kinds of EC work.
Notwithstanding key differences in their mechanisms of action—
that is, how the drug acts in a woman’s body—supporters and
opponents alike lump all EC together as if they work by precisely
the same mechanism, glossing over important differences.7
byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated May 2013)
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter FDA Birth Control Guide] (describing
various types of birth control, their utility, and how they work) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. Complaint at 7, Sharpe Holding v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human
Servs., (E.D. Mo. 2012) (No. 2:12-CV-92), http://www.becketfund.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/Sharpe-Holdings-complaint.pdf; see also Timothy
Dolan, HHS Contraception Mandate “Un-American”, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 2012,
2:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/ forum/story/2012-0125/dolan-hhs-health-contraceptive-mandate/52788780/1 (last visited Jan. 14,
2014) (“[T]he contraceptives mandated as ‘preventive services’ will include
abortifacients.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. Cecila Munoz, Health Reform, Preventative Services, and Religious
Institutions, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012, 6:35PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/health-reform-preventive-servicesand-religious-institutions (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Administration has consistently
maintained that the Mandate does “not include abortifacient drugs.” See infra
note 36 and accompanying text.
6. WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEDICAL
ABORTION AND EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE PILLS, ASS’N OF REPROD. HEALTH
PROF’LS 1 (Dec. 2010), http://www.arhp.org/uploadDocs/mifepristone_ecfact
sheet.pdf [hereinafter WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW].
7. See infra Part III.A and accompanying footnotes (discussing the
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Compounding the competing explanations about how EC
works is the fact that both sides mean very different things when
they claim something is or is not “abortion-causing.”8 Mandate
supporters contend that pregnancy begins when “a pre-embryo
completes implantation,”9 while objectors believe the “life of every
human being [begins at] the moment of conception/fertilization,”10
making its destruction “the killing of an innocent person.”11
For women contemplating EC, separating “fact from fiction”
is no easy task12: “Since the approval of [ella] . . . there has been
even more confusion and controversy.”13 Precisely because of
“myths” swirling around “in the popular press and on the
internet,” some women are now asking “tough questions about
mechanisms of action.”14
While some discount concerns about whether EC works after
fertilization as a form of “zygote worship”15 shared only by
different likely mechanisms of action for Plan B and ella and how they affect the
female reproductive system).
8. See infra Part II (discussing the confusion over what is and is not an
abortion-causing drug).
9. What You Need to Know, supra note 6, at 1.
10. Complaint at 2, 9, 11–13, Tyndale House Publishers v. Sebelius,
(D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2013) (No. 1:12-CV-1635-RBW), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/
TyndaleComplaint.pdf.
11. Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3, QC Group,
Inc. v. Sebelius, (D. Minn. July 2, 2013) (No. 0:13-CV-01726), http://www.
becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/1-Verified-Complaint-for-Declara
tory-and-Injunctive-Relief-7-2-13.pdf. Like many Catholic groups that have sued
the Administration, QC also believes that:
God, the Creator of human life, does not condone the use of birth
control (which includes ella, Plan B, the Pill, and other forms of
contraceptive required by the HHS Mandate) in any form because
they interfere with God’s sovereign will regarding whether and when
human beings should be born.
Id. As one of the authors notes elsewhere, few Americans object to contraceptive
use. See Wilson, The Calculus, supra note 2, at 1454 n.134 (citing a CBS News
opinion poll).
12. Pelin Batur, Emergency contraception: Separating fact from fiction, 79
CLEVELAND CLINIC J. OF MED. 771, 771 (2012), available at
http://www.ccjm.org/content/79/11/771.full.pdf+html.
13. See id. (identifying and explaining common misunderstandings about
ella).
14. Id. at 771, 774.
15. I am indebted to Professor Jacqueline R. Fox, University of South
Carolina, School of Law, for bringing this term to my attention at the August
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religious zealots, many women of child-bearing age remain torn
over using EC.16 For some, these qualms flow directly from their
belief that life begins at fertilization. Although not an universally
held view, deeply personal views about the beginning of life raise
the question: Shouldn’t doctors have an “open and honest
conversation[ ] in layman’s terms regarding EC, its benefits, and
its potential consequences and let the patient make her own
decision”?17
This Article maintains that a physician’s “guidance on how
and when to use [EC]”18 is necessary to equip women with the
information needed to make informed decisions about their bodies
and healthcare, guided by “their own moral or religious beliefs.”19
Part II briefly recaps how the Mandate reinvigorated public
concerns about abortion. It shows that religious objectors lifted
their concerns about the contested drugs and devices directly
from each label approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)—as the Administration concedes in the litigation over the

2013 Southeastern Association of Law Schools conference.
16. See infra Part IV (discussing the ethical dilemma women often face in
deciding whether to use EC).
17. Jennifer L. Wallace, et al., Letters to the Editor, In Response, Does
Pregnancy Begin at Fertilization?, Author’s Response, 36 FAM. MED. 690, 691
(2004), http://www.stfm.org/fmhub/fm2004/November/Walter690.pdf.
18. Batur, supra note 12, at 771. Plan B’s accessibility on the shelf presents
added complexity to this issue. See infra note 66 (discussing the availability of
Plan B without a prescription or required interaction with a pharmacist). Thus,
women may not consult a physician or other professional before taking Plan B.
Therefore, the drug’s label should reflect accurate, accessible, and up-to-date
information regarding the drug’s mechanism of action. See infra Part III
(discussing fourteen years of scientific evidence that Plan B does not act after
fertilization, despite disclosures on Plan B’s label). Furthermore, primary care
physicians may also want to inform women seeking contraceptives about how
specific kinds of EC work.
19. Charles J. Lockwood, OTC Emergency Contraception: The Right Choice,
49 CONTEMP. OB/GYN 12, 15 (2004). Other healthcare professionals, such as
pharmacists, also have a role to play in providing women with the necessary
information to make informed decisions regarding EC use. See generally
EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION, EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION GUIDELINES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES (2014),
http://www.ec-ec.org/custom-content/uploads/2014/03/ECEC_EC-Guidelines-inEU-countries_Feb2014.pdf. Therefore, while this Article deals primarily with
informed consent law as applied to physicians, informed consent principles
should animate the responsibilities of other healthcare professionals as well.
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Mandate presently before the U.S. Supreme Court.20 Part III then
assesses the conflicting claims made by both sides about how the
contested drugs and devices actually work, focusing on two: Plan
B and ella.21 This Part shows that since Plan B’s approval in
1999, it has never been shown to work after fertilization—despite
statements on its own label.22 By contrast, ella is believed to
“have an additional action of affecting the ability of the embryo to
either attach to the endometrium or maintain its attachment, by
a variety of mechanisms” after fertilization.23 As Part IV
documents, significant numbers of women care deeply about
whether a given drug acts after fertilization to prevent or disrupt
implantation.24
Part V turns to the two prevailing standards for determining
what patients should be told when providing fully informed
consent to a treatment—the professional standard and the
material risk standard. This Part concludes that under either
standard, doctors have a duty to help women decipher the dense,
technical explanations found on the FDA-approved labels if
women are to make informed decisions to use EC guided by their
own values.25 In doing so, physicians can add much-needed clarity
to an issue muddied by political rancor, while enhancing the
autonomy of the very women the Mandate sought to empower
and assist.26

20. See infra Parts II and III; Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, supra
note 3 (explaining various types of birth control).
21. See infra Part III.A (detailing how Plan B and ella work).
22. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (comparing the drug
labels of ella and Plan B); infra Part III.A.1 (discussing when and how Plan B
works).
23. Batur, supra note 12, at 774; see also Part III.A.2.
24. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordance Care
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54;
29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (“[B]oth existing health
coverage and existing preventive services recommendations often did not
adequately serve the unique health needs of women. This disparity placed
women in the workforce at a disadvantage . . . . [A]ccess to contraception
improves the social and economic status of women.”).
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II. A Resurgent Abortion Debate
In the years before the Mandate entered the public psyche,
reporting about “abortion-inducing drugs” was minimal.27 As
Figure 1 illustrates, after the Administration promulgated rules
requiring coverage of “all-FDA approved contraceptives” in
August 2011,28 news reports about “abortion-inducing,”
“abortifacient,” and “abortion-causing” drugs spiked and brought
this concern fully into the American consciousness. 29

27. Prior to the Mandate, it was healthcare providers who principally
asserted religious objections to EC. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of
Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive Health Care Procedures, 34 AM.
J.L. & MED. 41, 52–54 (2008) [hereinafter The Limits] (discussing refusals from
healthcare facilities to perform abortions and prescribe EC, which resulted in
the development of a private clinic industry); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The
Erupting Clash Between Religion and the State Over Contraception,
Sterilization, and Abortion, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA: CONSTITUTIONAL
ROOTS AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES (Allen D. Hertzke, ed., Univ. of Okla.
Press 2014) (forthcoming) (discussing recent clashes over providing EC and
abortions by nurses at two major medical centers); see also GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES 3
(Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf
(charting “policies allowing providers to refuse” to provide abortion,
contraception, and sterilization).
28. See supra note 2 (charting the evolution of the regulations requiring
expanded coverage in accordance with HRSA Guidelines).
29. Three “All News” searches on Lexis for U.S. news pieces containing the
terms “abortion-inducing,” “abortifacient,” or “abortion-causing” are telling:

2013

2012

2011

2010

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2009

43 73
36 30
6
5
85 108

2008

“abortion-inducing”
“abortifacient”
“abortion-causing”
TOTAL

2000

FREQUENCY OF TERM IN A GIVEN YEAR
1999

TERM

31 8 20 3 46 33 6 5
34 26 22 30 79 116 49 64
5 1 7 2 16 12 11 6
70 35 49 35 141 161 66 75

12
64
11
87

20 125 1193 1225
56 143 816 428
14 28 125
91
90 296 2134 1744
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Figure 1. Reporting About
"Abortion-Inducing" Drugs by Year
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

Reporters quickly spotlighted the controversy. Headlines
routinely touted one perspective or another: “Obamacare
Mandates (Free) Coverage of Abortion Drug”30 and “Emergency
Contraception Is Not Abortion.”31
Mandate supporters and opponents staked out opposing,
public positions. In “Six Things Everyone Should Know About the
HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] Mandate,” the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, a Mandate
opponent, forcefully asserted: “[B]y including all drugs approved
by the FDA for use as contraceptives, the HHS mandate includes
drugs that can induce abortion, such as ‘ella,’ a close cousin of the
abortion pill RU-486.”32 Supporters, like the American Congress
30. See Jeffrey Anderson, Obamacare Mandates (Free) Coverage of Abortion
Drug, THE WEEKLY STANDARD: THE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamacare-mandates-coverage-abortiondrug_581969.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (criticizing the Mandate) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See Amanda Marcotte, Emergency Contraception Is Not Abortion,
SLATE: THE XX FACTOR (June 6, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
xx_factor/2012/06/06/the_new_york_times_confirms_that_emergency_contracept
ion_only_works_by_suppressing_ovulation_.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014)
(discussing a recent New York Times article on EC) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
32. Six Things Everyone Should Know About the Health and Human
Services Mandate, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-021.cfm (last visited Dec. 29, 2013) (on file
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of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, came to the Mandate’s
defense: “Abortion coverage is not required to be part of a
minimum benefits package, and no federal funds or tax credits
may be used to pay for abortions, except for abortions in case of
rape, incest, and when the pregnancy puts the mother’s life in
danger.”33
Although the better news reports and public statements
unpacked exactly what they meant by “abortifacient” or
“abortion-causing drug,”34 many did not.35 Even the
Administration could have shed more light than it did. An HHSdrafted Factsheet about the Mandate flatly declared that
“[a]bortifacient drugs are not included.”36 After exempting
nonprofit religious objectors, the Administration continued to
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, ACOG’S HEALTH
CARE REFORM FAQS FOR WOMEN 1–2 (May 2010), available at
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Departments/Health%20Care%20Reform/201005H
CRFAQsForWomen.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20131211T1254164769.
The
American
Congress and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists are
companion entities. Id.
34. See Marcotte, supra note 31 (“[A]bortion terminates pregnancy, which
begins at implantation.”); Anderson, supra note 30 (stating that abortifacients
work by “by keeping a fertilized egg (or a newly conceived being) from
implanting in the uterine wall”); Six Things Everyone Should Know, supra note
32 (noting that the HHS Mandate included coverage of ella, which the
Conference considered to be an abortion-inducing drug).
35. See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Obama Revises Mandate: Free AbortionCausing Drugs for Women, LIFENEWS.COM (Feb. 20, 2012, 12:55 PM),
http://www.lifenews.com/2012/02/10/obama-revises-mandate-free-abortioncausing-drugs-for-women/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“The Obama
administration has revised its controversial mandate that had forced religious
employers to pay for health insurance coverage that includes birth control and
drugs like Plan B, the morning after pill, and ella that can cause abortions.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Paige Winfield Cunningham,
White House: Insurers Must Cover Abortion Pill, THE WASH. TIMES (Aug. 1,
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/1/white-house-insurersmust-cover-abortion-pill/?page=all (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (failing to define
“abortion” in distinguishing required coverage of Plan B, but not RU-486) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. Factsheet: Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Access to Preventive
Services for Women, on file with the author. HHS appears to have taken down
the Factsheet, but a search now leads to this: Affordable Care Act Rules on
Expanding Access to Preventive Services for Women, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2011/08/womens
prevention08012011a.html (last updated Jun. 2013) (last visited Mar. 5, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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summarily dismiss concerns that mandated drugs in fact cause
abortions: “[T]he regulations do not violate federal restrictions
relating to abortion because FDA-approved methods, including
Plan B, ella, and IUDs, are not abortifacients within the meaning
of federal law.”37
Ironically, the FDA labels for each contested drug supplied
the basis for objectors’ concerns. The label for Plan B One-Step
reads:
Emergency contraceptive pills are not effective if a woman is
already pregnant. Plan B One-Step is believed to act as an
emergency contraceptive principally by preventing ovulation
or fertilization (by altering tubal transport of sperm and/or
ova). In addition, it may inhibit implantation (by altering the
endometrium). It is not effective once the process of
implantation has begun.38

The label for ella says: “When taken immediately before ovulation
is to occur, ella postpones follicular rupture. The likely primary
mechanism of action of [ella] for emergency contraception is
therefore inhibition or delay of ovulation; however, alterations to
the endometrium that may affect implantation may also
contribute to efficacy.”39
While both drugs indicate that they may function
postfertilization, the fine print in their package inserts—for those
who bother to read them40—would only muddy the question of
whether the drug acts as an abortifacient.41 For example, in
37. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29
C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 8611 (Feb.
25, 1997) (“Emergency contraceptive pills are not effective if the woman is
pregnant[.]”); 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (“Pregnancy encompasses the period of time
from implantation until delivery.”).
38. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label /2009/021998lbl.pdf (listing
drug information for Plan B) (emphasis added).
39. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2010/022474s000lbl.pdf
(listing drug information for ella) (emphasis added).
40. See infra Part V (detailing that drug inserts are designed for physicians
who act as an intermediary).
41. See The FDA Announces New Prescription Drug Information Format,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/LawsActsandRules/ucm188665.htm (last visited Dec. 30,
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highly technical language,42 Plan B One-Step’s label says: “Plan B
One-Step is believed to act as an emergency contraceptive
principally by preventing ovulation or fertilization (by altering
tubal transport of sperm and/or ova). In addition, it may inhibit
implantation (by altering the endometrium).”43 Even though the
label recognizes the possibility that Plan B One-Step may act
postfertilization—a time that some would consider during
“pregnancy”44—the label elsewhere flatly says it “is not effective
in terminating an existing pregnancy.”45
Implicit in both disclosures is a central claim: a woman is not
“pregnant” until “implantation” occurs. Skeptics dismiss concerns
that EC may destroy a zygote after fertilization but before
implantation as just so much religious gibberish: “There’s no
reason to think [the anti-choice movement will] suddenly grow
respectful of actual science now that it has shown that emergency
contraception has no effect on egg cells who’ve had their good
Christian souls injected into them by those emissaries of the Lord
known as sperm.”46
Religious concerns about destroying a life, however,
animate the Hobby Lobby Store, Inc. v. Sebelius47 and Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius48 cases challenging the
2013) (“By improving the package insert to make it more useful for healthcare
providers in their day-to-day clinical practice, we are making it easier for them
to explain the benefits and risks of medications for their patients.” (quoting
Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavit)) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. Generally, informed consent forms should be understandable by people
with an eighth grade or lower reading level. See CARL H. COLEMAN, JERRY A.
MENIKOFF, ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS 181 (LexisNexis 2005).
43. PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 4.
44. See infra Part III.A.1.
45. PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 2. Plan B
One-Step’s label also says it does not work “once the process of implantation has
begun.” Id. at 4. By contrast, ella’s label provides no such assurance. But see
ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 39, at 5 (stating that ella “postpones
follicular rupture”).
46. Marcotte, supra note 31.
47. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en
banc), appeal docketed, No. 13-354 (S. Ct. Sept. 19, 2013).
48. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1144 (3d Cir.
2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-356 (S. Ct. Sept. 19, 2013).
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Mandate,49 which are now set before the United States Supreme
Court for argument on March 25, 2014.50 In that litigation, the
plaintiffs object to “drugs or devices that may cause the demise of
an already conceived but not yet attached human embryo,”
although they assert no objection to drugs that prevent
fertilization.51 The en banc United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit chose not to “wade into scientific waters,” noting
that “the government and the medical amici supporting the
government concede that at least some [EC] to which the
plaintiffs object have the potential to prevent uterine
implantation.”52 Given the parties’ agreement that some forms of
EC function in a manner that the plaintiffs “find morally
problematic,” the en banc court found “no material dispute” about
the science. Apart from the other issues those cases raises, the
49. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir.
2013) (en banc) (challenging the Mandate). The plaintiffs sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, alleging that the Mandate violated the Free Exercise
Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. The court held that the
plaintiffs had standing, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the action, that
corporations constituted “persons” within the meaning of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, that corporations had rights under the Free Exercise Clause,
that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits, that the
Administration’s interests in public health and gender equality do not constitute
compelling interests, that the plaintiffs satisfied the irreparable injury prong for
the preliminary injunction test, and that the case required remanding for
consideration of the remaining preliminary injunction factors. Id. at 1121, 1129,
1143–47; see also Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377,
380 (3d Cir. 2013) (challenging aspects of the Mandate). A corporate employer
and five owners brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging
that the Mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First and
Fifth Amendments, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The court held
that a for-profit, secular employer could not assert claims under the Free
Exercise Clause or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. at 388. The court
further held that the shareholders probably did not have a viable claim under
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 389.
50. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER TERM 2014: FOR THE
SESSION BEGINNING MARCH 24, 2014, 1 (2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalMar2014.pdf.
51. Complaint at 10, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F.
Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Penn. 2013) (No. 12-6744); see also Complaint Paragraph at
24, Hobby Lobby Sores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012)
(No. CIV-12-1000-HE) (“Plan B, Ella, and certain IUDs can cause the death of
the embryo.”).
52. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 n.3 (10th Cir.
2013) (en banc).
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science remains deeply contested by many, in part because of
where different parties draw the line for when they believe life
begins.53
The next Part evaluates the factual claim that neither Plan
B nor ella act after fertilization.
III. Factual Basis for Religious Concerns
The claim that EC does not cause abortion rests on two
notions: (1) that EC works only as a contraceptive to prevent
fertilization and never functions afterwards; and (2) that even if a
drug worked postfertilization, nobody could possibly believe that
a pregnancy—or a life—exists in the hours and days after
fertilization, so any drug that works at this time cannot induce an
“abortion” by definition.54
This Part shows first that in the fifteen years since its
approval, Plan B has never been shown to work after fertilization.
Since ella’s approval in 2010,55 however, more than one expert
has posited that ella not only works before fertilization but it may
work after fertilization as well—in ways that would give some
women pause about whether to use ella.56 Second, this Part
53. Id.
54. Nobody disputes that an abortion ends a pregnancy. See Abortion, THE
FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/abortion (last visited Feb.
11, 2014) (defining abortion as “[i]nduced termination of a pregnancy with
destruction of the embryo or fetus”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
55. News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves ella Tablets for
Prescription Emergency Contraception (Aug. 13, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm
(announcing
FDA approval of ella for use as emergency contraception).
56. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing how ella may work). This Article does
not examine the science behind the other contested drugs and devices because
the contrast between Plan B and ella sufficiently illustrates the factual debate
over how different ECs work. Although not necessary to this Article, the IUD
labels contain similar disclosures to those for ella. For a discussion of copper
IUDs, see Batur, supra note 12, at 774 (explaining that “the copper IUD also
prevents implantation after fertilization, which likely explains its high
efficacy”). For further discussion, see generally Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson,
Cecilia Berger & P.G.L. Lalitkumar, Review Article: Emergency Contraception—
Mechanisms of Action, 87 CONTRACEPTION 300 (2013) (discussing mechanisms of
action of IUDs and their physiological effects). For a searchable database of FDA
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documents that—although a handful of medical organizations
and federal regulators share the same view of when pregnancy
begins—medical treatises, dictionaries, and practicing Ob/Gyns
are all over the map on the question of when pregnancy—or for
that matter, when life—begins. More fundamentally, women
themselves have strikingly different views about when life
begins—and what would count as ending it.57 Ultimately, what
matters is their view as to whether a given drug constitutes an
abortion.
A. Contraceptives or Abortifacients?: Unraveling Science and
Semantics
Nearly everyone—from the Administration to religious
objectors to the New York Times—lumps all EC together,
charging that they do or do not cause abortions.58 As Part II
drugs, see FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRUGS AT FDA: FDA APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS (2013), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugs
atfda/.
57. See infra Part IV.
58. See Editorial, How Morning After Pills Really Work, N.Y. TIMES, June
8, 2012 at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/howmorning-after-pills-really-work.html (referring to all EC as simply the “the
pill”); What You Need to Know, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that “[a]ccording to
the best scientific evidence available, all FDA-approved emergency
contraceptive pills work by interfering with ovulation or fertilization before
pregnancy begins and are not so-called ‘abortion pills’”); Q&A with Dr. Cullins:
Emergency
Contraception,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
http://www.planned
parenthood.org/health-topics/ask-dr-cullins/cullins-ec-5360.htm (last visited Dec.
20, 2013) (discussing the mechanism of action of EC as if all EC is the same,
stating “EC works by stopping ovulation or fertilization . . . it could interfere
with the implantation of a fertilized egg, but there is no scientific proof that this
happens”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Complaint at 5,
La. Coll. v. Sebelius, (W.D. La. Feb. 18, 2012) (No. 12-cv-463),
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/LouisianaCollegeComplaint.pdf
In the category of “FDA approved contraceptives” included in this
Mandate are several drugs or devices that may cause the demise of
an already-conceived but not-yet implanted human embryo. . . .
Likewise in that category are “emergency contraception” or “Plan B”
(the “morning after” pill), and variations of oral contraceptives (“birth
control pills” or “the Pill”) taken regularly through a cycle. . . . The
FDA approved in this same category a drug called “ella” (the “week
after” pill), which studies show can function to kill embryos even after
they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar to the
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illustrated, the FDA label disclosures lend to a singular narrative
about how these drugs work, but the science plainly does not.59
Consider the 2013 review article, “Separating Fact from
Fiction,”60 by the Independent Family Health Center at the
Cleveland Clinic, home of the third-ranked gynecology program
in the United States.61 The review article surveyed dozens of
scientific, peer-reviewed articles across more than a decade,
including one meta-analysis of the literature. The author, Dr.
Pelin Batur, Education Director of Primary Care of Women’s
Health, concluded that both Plan B and ella “work[] primarily by
delaying or inhibiting ovulation and inhibiting fertilization.”62
Nonetheless, important differences exist between Plan B’s and
ella’s mechanisms of action: “[Plan B] . . . would be unlikely to
have any adverse effects on the endometrium after fertilization,
since [it] would only serve to enhance the progesterone effect.
Therefore, [it is] unlikely to affect the ability of the embryo to
attach to the endometrium.”63 By contrast, ella
can have just the opposite effect on the postovulatory
endometrium because of its inhibitory action on progesterone.
[Ella] is structurally similar to [RU-486], and its mechanism of
action varies depending on the time of administration during
the menstrual cycle. When unprotected intercourse occurs
during a time when fertility is not possible, [ella] behaves like
a placebo. When intercourse occurs just before ovulation, [ella]
acts by delaying ovulation and thereby preventing fertilization
(similar to [Plan B]). [Ella] may have an additional action of
affecting the ability of the embryo to either attach to the
endometrium or maintain its attachment, by a variety of
mechanisms of action.64

abortion drug RU-486.
59. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that ella can work
very differently from Plan B under certain circumstances).
60. Batur, supra note 12, at 771 (dispelling common misunderstandings
about EC).
61. Top-Ranked Hospitals for Gynecology, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.
(2013), http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings/gynecology (last visited
Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. Batur, supra note 12, at 774.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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As the next subparts detail, our independent review of the
scientific literature reaches the same conclusion: in all
probability, Plan B does not work after fertilization, despite the
FDA-approved label, while ella may act after fertilization,
sometimes.
1. How Plan B Works
It is no surprise that many want to lump Plan B and ella
together: both work after unprotected sex to prevent “expected
pregnancy.”65 At one point, both drugs required a prescription,
although Plan B can now be found on the shelf next to common
cold medicines, suppositories, and condoms.66
While Plan B is effective for only 72 hours after sex,67 ella
works over a longer time span. Ella remains effective up to 120
hours after sex.68 Given the longer timespan, ella is much more
effective in preventing pregnancy than Plan B.69 In one 2006
study, women who received ella experienced “about half the
number of pregnancies than in those treated with [Plan B], with
65. See PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 1
(stating that Plan B is intended for use as an EC after unprotected intercourse);
ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 39, at 1 (noting the ella is also
intended for use after unprotected intercourse to prevent pregnancy).“Expected
Pregnancy” “calculate[es] the number of pregnancies that might have occurred
without use of the intervention.” Anna F. Glacier et al., Ulipristal Acetate Versus
Levonorgestrel for Emergency Contraception: A Randomised Non-Inferiority
Trial and Meta-Analysis, 375 LANCET 555, 555 (2010).
66. See Julie Rovner, Plan B to Hit Shelves, Protected from Generics, NPR
(July 24, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/07/24/
205182187/plan-b-to-hit-shelves-protected-from-generics (last visited Jan. 21,
2014) (“Plan B One-Step . . . will be available on pharmacy and other retail
shelves without restriction.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Sydney Lupkin, Judge Orders “Morning-After” Pill Be Sold Over-theCounter to Those Under 17, ABCNEWS (Apr. 5, 2013), http://abcnews.
go.com/Health/morning-pill-sold-counter/story?id=18889946 (last visited Jan.
21, 2014) (“The FDA allowed Plan B to become available without a prescription
to women 18 and over in 2006.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Ella still requires a prescription. See News Release, supra note 55
(noting that ella is available “by prescription-only”).
67. PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 1.
68. ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 39, at 1.
69. See Batur, supra note 12, at 772 (noting that ella is the most effective
oral EC).
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pregnancy rates of 0.9% vs 1.7%.”70 A later study found that ella
prevented 85% of expected pregnancies compared to Plan B’s
69%.71
Part and parcel of Plan B’s reduced efficacy are the
mechanisms by which it is now understood to work. Amassed
across fifteen years and thousands of articles,72 authorities agree
that Plan B works73 to delay or inhibit ovulation: “Early
treatment with [EC]s containing only the progestin
levonorgestrel [as Plan B does] has been shown to impair the
ovulatory process and luteal function.”74 While a single study has
suggested that Plan B may affect receptivity of the endometrium,
two later studies directly designed to assess this possibility could
not confirm it.75All available evidence suggests Plan B acts prior
70. Id.
71. See Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Chun-Xia Meng, Emergency
Contraception: Potential Role of Ulipristal Acetate, 2 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH
53, 57 (2010) (comparing results in an efficacy study of ECs).
72. Two searches on ScienceDirect.com, one limited by “levonorgestrel,”
Plan B’s chemical name, and the other by “ulipristal acetate,” ella’s chemical
name, yield 7,815 journals, 627 books, and 43 reference works for Plan B and a
mere 114 journals, 29 book, and 0 reference works for ella. Review articles show
the same pattern. One review article of the mechanism of action for various EC
canvassed 28 studies of Plan B but included only 3 studies of ella. See GemzellDanielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 306–08 (listing references
for the article, including the studies on which the discussion was based).
73. At one time, some speculated that Plan B also impeded the sperm, but
authorities now agree that Plan B is not likely to work this way at commercially
available doses. See James Trussell, Elizabeth G. Raymond & Kelly Cleland,
Emergency Contraception: A Last Chance to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy 6
(Dec. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecreview.pdf
In a study conducted more than 30 years ago, levonorgestrel was
found to interfere with sperm migration and function at all levels of
the genital tract; however, a study designed to assess this issue found
that 1.5 mg levonorgestrel had no effect on the quality of cervical
mucus or on the penetration of spermatozoa in the uterine cavity.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger
& Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 302 (“In vitro data indicate that [Plan B] . . . in
doses relevant for EC has no direct effect on sperm function.”).
74. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 6.
75. See id. (discussing studies on early treatment with EC pills). Further,
one study found no effect on the endometrium while the other found that Plan B
does affect concentrations of glycodelin, a molecule that “inhibits fertilization,
[and] may indicate an additional mechanism of action when ovulation is not
inhibited.” Id.
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to fertilization, as an ordinary contraceptive. In essence, the
sperm never meets the egg.
While Plan B’s mechanism of action has been extensively
studied, permitting experts to now rule out a postfertilization
mechanism of action,76 ella lacks this depth of research.77
Although nascent, a burgeoning literature seeks to pinpoint
precisely what explains ella’s “enhanced effectiveness.”78
2. How Ella May Work
Leading authorities agree that, like Plan B, ella’s primary
mechanism of action is to prevent ovulation.79 The key difference
76. See Batur, supra note 12, at 774 (finding Plan B unlikely to have any
effects after fertilization); Trussell, supra note 73, at 7 (noting Plan B has no
effect after fertilization), Gemzell-Danielsson, supra note 56, at 302 (finding no
effect after fertilization when using Plan B in studies with monkeys and rats).
Of course, no study can definitely, positively, absolutely exclude the possibility
of a postfertilization effect, even as to Plan B. Authors of the studies showing a
contraceptive effect acknowledge that “[i]t is unlikely that this question can ever
be unequivocally answered, and we therefore cannot conclude that [ECs] never
prevent pregnancy after fertilization.” James Trussell & Beth Jordan,
Mechanism of Action of Emergency Contraception Pills, 74 CONTRACEPTION 87,
87 (2006); see also Gabriela Noe et al., Contraceptive Efficacy of Emergency
Contraception with Levonorgestrel Given Before or After Ovulation, 81
CONTRACEPTION 414, 414 (2010) (conceding that studies of Plan B’s impact on
“endometrial receptivity,” a post fertilization effect, “are not consistent, and
current knowledge on cellular and molecular markers of endometrial receptivity
in the human is insufficient to resolve this controversy”).
As Jeffrey Keenan, a professor of obstetrics and gynecology and director of
the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility at the University of
Tennessee Medical Center, explains, clinical studies of Plan B “were not
designed to assess this possibility.” Jeffrey Keenan, Ulipristal Acetate:
Contraceptive or Contragestive?, 45 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 813, 814
(2011). To give of the kind of certainty that some would like to see, “each study
participant [would have had] to undergo laboratory evaluation and possibly
sonographic examination to determine whether ovulation had already occurred.”
Id. Asking women themselves may not be promising, given the fact that “over
30% of women presenting for [EC]s had inaccurately dated their own menstrual
cycles.” Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 3.
77. See supra note 72 (noting that available information on ella is
somewhat limited).
78. Keenan, supra note 76, at 814.
79. See Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7 (discussing more
than a half dozen studies that indicated ella prevents ovulation); GemzellDanielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 302 (discussing the effect of
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between the two: ella “is able to inhibit or significantly delay
follicular rupture for over 5 days if given immediately before
ovulation by postponing the LH peak”—that is, the spike of the
hormone that triggers ovulation.80 Thus, “when ovulation is
imminent, [ella] is more effective than [Plan B] in delaying
[ovulation].”81
While authorities universally agree that ella delays
ovulation,82 they are divided about whether ella may work by
other mechanisms as well, as ella’s label suggests. Some posit
that ella may work through a “contragestive” effect, in which
“only gestation (implantation and growth) of the embryo
[fertilized egg] is prevented.”83 When would this occur?
It would occur if ella altered the endometrium and the
change “hamper[ed] implantation.”84 In a 2010 study, Pamela
Stratton and colleagues examined the effects of three different
doses of ella on the endometrium and compared them to a

ella on ovulation); Ralph P. Miech, Immunopharmacology of Ulipristal as an
Emergency Contraceptive, 3 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 391, 392 (2011) (noting
that ella acts by delaying ovulation); Keenan, supra note 76, at 813 (noting that
ella’s primary function is to prevent ovulation, and that ella is “significantly
more effective in this role than other forms of [EC]”).
80. See V. Brache et al., Immediate Pre-Ovulatory Administration of 30 mg
Ulipristal Acetate Significantly Delays Follicular Rupture, HUM. REPROD. 2256,
2262 (2010) (concluding that “this study provides mechanistic evidence to
explain how [ella] could be more effective in preventing pregnancy than current
reference EC methods”).
As another review article puts it, the primary explanation for ella’s
increased effectiveness over Plan B is that ella is “effective even when
administered before ovulation, when LH has already started to rise, a time
period when [Plan B] is no longer effective.” Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger &
Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 305.
81. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 4.
82. See also Miech, supra note 79, at 392 (“[ella’s] effectiveness as an EC is
extended up to 120 hours after intercourse . . . and is [] effective as an EC if
taken during rising LH levels prior to ovulation.”); Keenan, supra note 76, at
813 (“There is good reason to believe that one mechanism of action for [ella] is
the inhibition of ovulation. In fact, it appears to be significantly more effective in
this role than other forms of [EC] such as [Plan B] . . . .”).
83. Keenan, supra note 76, at 814; see also ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION,
supra note 39, at 9 (noting that ella may work to prevent implantation).
84. Pamela Stratton et al., Dometrial Effects of a Single Early Luteal Dose
of the Selective Progesterone Receptor Modulator CDB-2914, 93 FERTILITY AND
STERILITY 2035, 2040 (2010).
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placebo.85 The authors found “a significant reduction in
endometrial thickness among those subjects receiving [ella]
compared with those receiving placebo.”86 They concluded that
“taken together, these endometrial effects in the absence of
ovarian and menstrual cycle effects suggest mechanisms by
which [ella] might be effective as an emergency contraceptive.”87
Importantly, others caution that “whether this change would
inhibit implantation is unknown.”88
A pair of experts has asked whether ella, if taken sufficiently
late, is in fact working after fertilization.89 Ralph Miech, an
associate professor emeritus of molecular pharmacology,
physiology, and biotechnology at Brown University, contends that
ella has a “direct abortifacient effect” in a very narrow set of
circumstances.90 He defines “abortifacient” to mean the “loss of
the embryo occurring either at the preimplantation stage or at
the post-implantation stage.”91 According to Miech, this would
occur “[w]hen unprotected intercourse occurs within the fertility
window (i.e., less than 120 hours (5 days) before ovulation or not
more than 24 hours after ovulation) and [ella] is taken after
fertilization.”92 He envisions a “host-versus-graft rejection
85. See id. at 2036 (examining whether ella, at any doses, delayed
endometrial maturation, reduced endometrial thickness, or affected the number
of progesterone receptors).
86. Id. at 2038.
87. Id. at 2040.
88. See Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 5 (discussing
Stratton’s findings). Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger, and Lalitkumar contend that
“the effect of lower doses equivalent to the 30 mg used for EC was similar to
that of placebo,” but this synopsis does not accord with the study findings
themselves. Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 304.
Cf. Stratton et al., supra note 84, at 2038 tbl.1 (reporting the endometrial effects
of ella).
89. See supra note 79 (noting that both authorities, Miech and Keenan,
agree that ella works primarily to prevent ovulation).
90. Miech, supra note 79, at 392.
91. Id. (“This report [uses] the classical definitions of abortion and
contraceptive. Abortion is defined as the loss of the embryo occurring either at
the preimplantation stage or at the post-implantation stage and contraception is
defined as the prevention of fertilization.”). A post-implantation effect would be
an abortifacient under almost every medical definition and those Federal
regulations in place since the 1970s. See supra note 37 and accompanying text
(discussing the difference between contraception and abortifacient drugs).
92. Miech, supra note 79, at 392.
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mechanism during the embryo’s attempt to implant into the
decidua.”93 In other words, ella may actually operate on the
embryo during the implantation process.
In a 2011 article in the Annals of Pharmacotherapy, Jeffrey
Keenan, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University
of Tennessee Medical Center in Knoxville, concluded that if a
woman takes ella within five days of unprotected sex and after
the fertilization, ella’s “mechanism of action is much more
accurately described as contragestive, since only gestation
(implantation and growth) of the embryo [fertilized egg] is
prevented.”94 Keenan believes this action likely accounts for ella’s
“enhanced effectiveness” relative to Plan B.95 Disclosures from
medical professionals and drug manufacturers should be
“provided according to the best evidence available,” as is the
standard in European Union countries.96 Some scientists move
past the concern that any kind of EC might act as an
abortifacient—in the views of women using them—by noting that
ECs “do not interrupt an established pregnancy, defined . . . as
beginning with implantation.”97 And as the next subpart
illustrates, even the meaning of pregnancy is deeply contested.
B. The Meaning of Life—Or at Least Pregnancy
Obviously, how one defines pregnancy determines whether a
given drug or device may induce an abortion in one’s view.98 Some
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Keenan, supra note 76, at 814; see also ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION,
supra note 39, at 9 (noting that ella “may also work by preventing attachment”).
95. See Keenan, supra note 76, at 814 (noting that ella’s “contragestive
effect” is likely why it is so effective).
96. See generally EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION,
supra note 19.
97. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7.
98. Vivian W. Y. Leung, Marc Levine & Judith A. Soon, Mechanisms of
Action of Hormonal Emergency Contraceptives, 30 PHARMACOTHERAPY 158, 160
(2010) (“For people who define pregnancy as beginning at implantation, an
abortifacient is an agent that interferes with subsequent processes. . . . For
those who consider pregnancy to begin with the completion of fertilization, an
abortifacient is an agent that interferes with any postfertilization event,
including implantation.”).
Some people may believe that pregnancy begins at implantation, yet
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groups, like the Guttmacher Institute, assert that the medical
profession uniformly measures pregnancy from “implantation.”99
The
evidence
for
this
proposition:
“Major
medical
organizations . . . as well as U.S. government policy, consider a
pregnancy to have begun only when the entire process of
conception is complete, which is to say after the fertilized egg has
implanted in the lining of the uterus.”100
Despite this confident assertion, a quick review of medical
authorities reveals no unitary view. Some authorities measure
pregnancy from fertilization101 and some from implantation.102
Others measure pregnancy from an “established pregnancy,”103 a

nonetheless believe that a drug that prevents implantation ends the existence of
either a living, human organism (short of a pregnancy) or destroys something
that has a special moral status. See infra notes 113–44.
99. See Sneha Barot, Past Due: Emergency Contraception in U.S.
Reproductive Health Programs Overseas, 13 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 8, 8 (2010),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/2/gpr130208.html (noting
that “the Catholic Church and many antiabortion advocates” embrace a
definition of pregnancy “flatly rejected by the medical profession” and that
“under this definition, pregnancy begins with the ‘moment of fertilization’—the
union of an egg and sperm”).
100. Id. at 8–9. Guttmacher also asserts that the meaning of “abortifacient”
in federal law is clear; however, it is not as unambiguous as Guttmacher would
have people believe. See Wilson, The Calculus, supra note 2, at 1456, 1459
(reviewing federal guidance about what counts as an abortifacient under federal
regulations); Wilson, Demagoguing Abortion, supra note 2 (summarizing federal
hearings in 1975 over the classifications of diethylstilbestrol as a contraceptive,
a drug that studies in the Congressional Record indicated works on the
endometrial implantation site, but was later pulled from the market as a
teratogen). The FDA classified diethylstilbestrol as a contraceptive because it
“prevent[ed] implantation.” Id. Ella is posited to work, sometimes, during the
process of implantation itself, raising a thorny question of how to construe
FDA’s definition. Id.
101. See Grace S. Chung et. al, Obstetrician-Gynecologists’ Beliefs About
When Pregnancy Begins, 206 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 132.e1, 132.e1
(2012), available at http://www.ajog.org/article/S0002-9378(11)02223-X/fulltext
(showing some measure pregnancy from fertilization).
102. See id. (“Since 1965, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) has defined pregnancy as beginning with implantation of
the embryo in the uterine wall. This definition is used also by the Guttmacher
Institute, Planned Parenthood, and some textbooks.” (footnotes omitted)).
103. See AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, STATEMENT ON
CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS 1 (1998) (listing the “[e]ssential steps necessary for
pregnancy” as ending with “implantation of the blastocyst into the lining of the
uterus at the conclusion of which pregnancy is established”).
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positive pregnancy test,104 and the first heartbeat,105 among
others.106 Clearly, however, the two leading contenders for the
beginning
of
pregnancy
are
“implantation”107
and
108
“fertilization.”
Medical professionals themselves split on what marks the
start of pregnancy. Fifty-seven percent of U.S. Ob/Gyns said
pregnancy begins at “conception,” by which the study authors
believed respondents meant fertilization.109 Twenty-eight percent
of Ob/Gyns said pregnancy begins at implantation, and sixteen
percent were “not sure which statement comes closest to their
beliefs.”110 Those surveyed brought preconceived notions to the
question. The strongest predictors of how Ob/Gyns defined
pregnancy were the importance of religion in their lives and their
own views on abortion.111

104. See Keenan, supra note 76, at 814 (attributing to ACOG a definition of
pregnancy that “begin[s] not with fertilization of the egg, but advancing
implantation as demonstrated by a positive pregnancy test” (footnote omitted)).
105. Chung et. al, supra note 102, at 132.e5.
106. See id. (noting that “a significant percentage of Ob/Gyn physicians
(16%) [who completed the questionnaire] marked ‘not sure’ when asked to
indicate when pregnancy begins”). The two primary options were “conception”
and “implantation.” Id. at 132.e1. Given the percentage of “not sure” responses,
“it is possible that a significant minority of physicians have not made up their
minds or that they believe that their views could not be reduced to either of the
2 options that were offered.” Id. at 132.e5.
107. See John K. Jain, When Does Pregnancy Begin?, SHARECARE,
http://www.sharecare.com/health/prior-to-conception/when-does-pregnancy-beg
in;jsessionid=787ABB31090D6282CC87D03389AE56BD (last visited Jan. 31,
2014) (concluding that “pregnancy officially begins at the time of implantation
but is usually not detectable until the pregnancy hormone shows up in the blood
and urine”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. See Walter L. Larimore, Joseph B. Stanford & Chris Kahlenborn,
Letters to the Editor: In Response: Does Pregnancy Begin at Fertilization?, 36
FAM. MED. 690, 690 (2004) (stating that many maintain pregnancy starts the
“instant that a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote”).
109. Chung et. al, supra note 102, at 132.e6.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 132.e3–e4 (“[R]eligious doctors and those who objected to
abortion were less likely to be ‘not sure’. . . . [B]elieving that pregnancy begins at
implantation rather than conception (excluding those who were ‘not sure’) was
associated with religious affiliation, the importance of religion, and objections to
abortion.”).
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Just as important as this split, pregnancy is often a proxy for
measuring the “onset of life.”112 Fertilization and implantation
are not the only two markers for measuring the “onset of life,” as
Dr. Maureen Condic, Associate Professor of Neurobiology and
Anatomy at the University of Utah School of Medicine, explains:
Recently, it has been asserted that the life and moral status of
the embryo begin at the eight-cell stage, because zygotic
transcription (the active utilization of embryonic genes)
commences at this time; and prior to this moment, whatever is
happening in the “fertilized egg” is being driven by maternal
factors. Some push the onset of life to even later, to the
formation of specific structures or the onset of specific
developmental processes. 113

Philosophers, theologians, ethicists, and others have devoted
thousands of pages to whether “personhood determines the
beginning of human life,” whether “rationality is necessary for
personhood,” and whether personhood begins with the “active
potential for further development as a person,” the “development
of the primitive streak,” or when the organism becomes a
“unique” individual.114 Some ask whether, even absent
personhood, the “embryo has a significant moral status” worthy of
respect.115
While the Guttmacher Institute, the Administration, and
others rely on the Code of Federal Regulations116 in dismissing
religiously grounded concerns, individual women follow their
personal moral codes, as the next Part explains.
112. See Condic, supra note 101, at 1–2 (describing various ways to
biologically define when life begins). For a general discussion of the beginning of
life, whether at pregnancy or other points or whether a potential life is due
special consideration, see the excellent book, DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END
OF LIFE: READINGS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS (John. P. Lizza ed.,
2009).
113. Condic, supra note 101, at 1 (footnotes omitted).
114. See John P. Lizza, Introduction to DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF
LIFE: READINGS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 1, 5 (John. P. Lizza ed.,
2009) (summarizing various theories included in the book on when life begins).
115. See id. (noting that “most Jewish thinkers” believe an embryo does not
become a “person” until birth but is nonetheless entitled to protection during
“gestation”).
116. See supra note 37 (showing reliance by the Administration on
regulatory definitions of pregnancy in other contexts); see also supra note 100
and accompanying text (discussing the definition of pregnancy).
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IV. Women Care About Mechanisms of Action
Caught in the midst of an argument by label, women are now
no more informed about how EC works than before the
Mandate.117 But they still care.
Physicians have long recognized that “the majority of
women . . . want to be informed . . . about mechanisms of action
taking place after fertilization and implantation, regardless of
their religiosity or whether they believed that human life begins
at fertilization or implantation.”118 In 2004, when the FDA made
Plan B available over the counter, the scientific advisory
committee to the FDA urged the FDA to include appropriate
disclosures on Plan B’s label precisely “so that women could make
an informed choice about its use and avoid inadvertently
violating their own moral or religious beliefs.”119 Disclosures from
medical professionals and drug manufacturers should be
“provided according to the best evidence available,” as is the
standard in European Union countries.120
Empirical studies of women’s attitudes across the United
States, in both urban and suburban settings, confirm the
importance that women place on information. A 2005 study of
women 18–50 seen in Utah and Oklahoma family practices and
Ob/Gyn clinics found that 53% would not use a birth-control
method that acts after fertilization but before implantation.121
117. Supra Part II.
118. Cristina Lopez-del Burgo et al., Knowledge and Beliefs About
Mechanism of Action Birth Control Methods Among European Women, 85
CONTRACEPTION 69, 75 (2012); see also Christy A. Sherman, S. Marie Harvey,
Linda J. Beckman & Diana B. Petitti, Emergency Contraception: Knowledge and
Attitudes of Health Care Providers in a Health Maintenance Organization, 11
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 448, 452 (2001) (surveying San Diego County,
California healthcare providers including Ob/Gyns and reporting that “[n]early
all (99.4%) of the providers surveyed reported they agreed with the statement
‘Women who specifically ask for information about emergency contraceptive
pills should be given information,’ with 85% of providers indicating strong
agreement”).
119. See Lockwood, supra note 19, at 15 (noting that “[m]any on the FDA
panel perceived that a contragestive effect [e.g., an effect after fertilization
occurs] was possible and we recommended that the package labeling should
describe the drug’s potential mechanism of action”).
120. See generally EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION,
supra note 19.
121. Huong M. Dye et al., Women and Post-Fertilization Effects of Birth
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Seventy-four percent would not use a method that acts after
implantation.122 When asked if they would change their own birth
control method if told that “there was a remote possibility” that it
acted after fertilization but before implantation, 44% “would stop
using it,” while 69% “would stop using it” if there was a “remote
possibility” of it acting after implantation.123
For many of these women, their reticence directly reflects
their beliefs about when life begins. Forty-eight percent of women
“reported the personal belief that human life begins at
fertilization” and another 5% answered that “life begins after
fertilization, but before implantation.”124 Of all women surveyed,
34% answered that “life begins at fertilization and [that they]
would not use a birth control method that acts [after
fertilization]”—while 3% answered that life starts at fertilization
but they would nonetheless use a birth control method that acts
after fertilization.125
Women in the southeastern United States also expressed deep
discomfort with EC that acts after fertilization. In an anonymous
2008 questionnaire of women seen at two academic family
medicine clinics, 38% of all respondents said they would use EC
but only if “it worked before fertilization or implantation,”126—
Control: Consistency of Beliefs, Intentions and Reported Use, 5 BMC WOMEN’S
HEALTH, Nov. 29, 2005, at 4, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/14726874-5-11.pdf. For a description of the study sites, see id. at 2–3 (noting that the
Oklahoma site was “a teaching clinic associated with a family medicine
residency program sponsored by a Protestant religious organization” and that
“[n]one of the clinics in Utah were religiously affiliated or sponsored”).
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. No EC required by the Mandate is presently understood to act after
implantation. See supra Part III (discussing RU-486, which is not mandated).
Surveys of women who are not faced directly with the possibility of pregnancy
after unprotected sex may not capture the views of women faced with that
possibility. Choices presented in a vacuum might look very different if a woman
suddenly finds herself in need of EC.
124. Dye et al., supra note 111, at 5.
125. Id. at 5–6.
126. See John W. Campbell III et al., Attitudes and Beliefs About Emergency
Contraception Among Patients at Academic Family Medicine Clinics, 6 ANNALS
FAM. MED. S23, S23 (2008) (utilizing a “convenience sample [size of 178] of
female patients aged 18 to 50 years.”). Researchers asked: “Pregnancy begins
when[:] A. Sperm and egg join within the female reproductive tract. B.
Implantation occurs. C. The heart starts beating. D. Unsure. E. Other.” Id. at
S24.
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admittedly an inartful question.127 Nearly half, 47%, “believed that
pregnancy begins with fertilization.”128 Isolating the impact of
socioeconomic factors, only annual household income of less than
$40,000 correlated with a woman’s belief that life begins at
fertilization—with those under $25,000 most likely to believe the
life begins at fertilization.129 Strength of religious beliefs, age,
race, and level of education were irrelevant.130 Ironically, the
women whose life chances are likely to be most impacted by an
unintended pregnancy—poorer women with fewer resources—
were precisely the ones most likely to believe that life begins at
fertilization.131
Researchers for John W. Campbell III and colleagues also
gauged knowledge of EC’s mechanism of action. A “majority of
women surveyed did not know that one possible mechanism of
action of EC is to prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum.”132
Although “women aged 25 years or younger were more likely to
think that EC works before the egg and sperm join than older
women[,] [t]here w[ere] no significant differences in the
perception . . . based on age, race, income, education, or strength
of religious beliefs.”133 The authors’ takeaway message was that
“m[a]ny women are uninformed about the possible mechanisms of
action of EC, and we found no reliable predictors for those who
were better informed.”134 Better knowledge would not matter to
everyone—42% were unsure whether better knowledge of a drug’s

127. The inartfully drafted “fertilization or implantation” question is not as
probative as it would have been if it had separated views about prefertilization
methods from postfertilization, pre-implantation methods.
128. Campbell et al., supra note 126, at S23. Although 47% of respondents
indicated that “pregnancy begins with fertilization,” only 30% believed that “life
begins with fertilization” even if pregnancy was not present. Id. (emphasis
added).
129. See id. at S25 (“Women with incomes of less than $40,000 [per year]
were more likely to believe that life begins at the joining of sperm and egg than
women with higher incomes.”).
130. Id. at S25–S26.
131. See generally NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE
FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).
132. Campbell et al., supra note 126, at S26.
133. Id. at S25–S26.
134. Id. at S23.
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mechanism would change their practices.135 Nonetheless, the
authors stressed the “need to better educate [women] about
[EC’s] possible mechanisms of action.”136
In a 2004 study of Latino women seen at two reproductive
health clinics in southeast Texas, “women who believed that EC
worked mainly by preventing implantation were significantly less
willing to use it than those who believed that it prevented
ovulation.”137 Religious background did not affect this
willingness,138 although factual misconceptions about EC did.139
As the authors noted, “EC reduces the risk of pregnancy by
preventing or delaying ovulation, inhibiting fertilization, and
possibly inhibiting implantation. However, a belief that
implantation is the primary mechanism or that EC interrupts
gestation would not be correct.”140 The authors found “the odds of
being unwilling to use EC were roughly six times higher among
women who believed that EC prevents pregnancy at implantation
when compared to women who believed that EC affects ovulation
processes.”141 The researchers chalked up unwillingness to use
EC to “misinformation about the mechanism of action.”142
Education to correct misconceptions about the mechanism of
action of EC would “help alleviate [Latino women’s] concerns,
which in turn may increase their willingness to use EC.”143
Although the researchers surveyed women in 2004—long before
ella came on the scene—the general proposition stands. For many
women, EC that “affects fertilization or implantation” is morally
objectionable.144
135. Id. at S25.
136. Id.
137. Laura F. Romo et al., The Role of Misconceptions on Latino Women’s
Acceptance of Emergency Contraceptive Pills, 69 CONTRACEPTION 227, 233
(2004).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 229 (endnote omitted).
141. Id. at 232.
142. Id. at 233 (“Specifically women who believed that EC prevents
pregnancy at ovulation reported less moral objections to its use than women
who believe that EC affects fertilization or implantation.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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While there is good reason to worry about the
representativeness of these studies, women in Europe,145
Mexico,146 and Spain147 also communicate uneasiness about drugs
that may act after fertilization. As the next Part argues, women
can vindicate their own beliefs and values only if informed, in
layman’s terms, about how these drugs may act in their own
bodies.
V. The Duty of Informed Consent
Aimed at autonomy, individual rights, and selfdetermination,148 informed consent fits naturally with American

145. See Lopez-del Burgo et al., supra note 118, at 69 (randomly surveying
women in “Germany, France, the UK, Sweden, and Romania” and finding that,
“[r]egardless of [participants’] sociodemographic characteristics and their belief
about when human life begins,” the “majority [of women surveyed, 75%,] want
to be informed about possible postfertilization effects [of contraceptive
methods]”).
146. See Heather Gould, Charlotte Ellertson & Georgina Corona, Knowledge
and Attitudes About the Difference Between Emergency Contraception and
Medical Abortion Among Middle-Class Women and Men of Reproductive Age in
Mexico City, 66 CONTRACEPTION 417, 423 (2002) (“Because one possible
mechanism of action involves impeding implantation of a fertilized egg, some
participants continue to equate EC with abortion.”).
147. See Cristina Lopez-del Burgo et al., Spanish Women’s Attitudes Toward
Post-Fertilization Effects of Birth Control Methods, 151 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY AND REPROD. BIOLOGY 56, 57 (2010) (finding that “45% of women
[surveyed] . . . would not consider using a [contraceptive] method that may work
after fertilization and 57% would not consider using one that may work after
implantation”).
148. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 14 (2d ed. 2001) (noting the values that guide informed
consent). As Bernard Lo notes, “participation in decisions generally has other
beneficial consequences for patients, such as increased sense of control, selfefficacy, and adherence to plans for care.” BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL
DILEMMAS: A GUIDE OF CLINICIANS 21 (2d ed. 2000). Not all patients want this.
See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 379, 419 (1990) (surveying evidence that “in many cases patients do
request or allow physicians to make decisions for them” (footnote omitted)); see
also infra note 166 and accompanying text (describing the “model of shared
decision making” between patients and doctors as responding to the desire of
some patients to provide input but not necessarily to make a decision on their
own).

1414

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385 (2014)

values and culture.149 As Justice Cardozo famously observed in
1914, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his body.”150 For much
of our history, however, informed consent played little to no role
in the doctor–patient relationship. In an era of paternalism,
“simple consent” sufficed before a physician treated a patient.151
Not surprisingly, “simple consent” sometimes amounted to no
consent at all.152
By the late 1950s, courts began to require meaningful
consent by patients. In Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior
149. See BERG ET AL., supra note 148, at 14 (explaining that such values are
“deeply embedded in American culture” and thus “[i]t is not surprising that
informed consent is a cornerstone of contemporary medical ethics and health
law in the United States”).
150. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
151. See BERG ET AL., supra note 149, at 43 (noting that historically “courts
have generally agreed that the patient has, by speaking some phrase,
authorized the physician to proceed and thereby provided the physician with a
defense to an action for battery”). We refer to this as a “simple consent”
requirement. Id.
152. See id. (noting that in early- to mid-twentieth-century cases courts
often found consent even when patients had expressly told the doctor not to
render treatment) (citing Markart v. Zeimer, 227 P. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924);
Meek v. City of Loveland, 276 Pac. 30 (Colo. 1929); Corn v. French, 289 P.2d 173
(Nev. 1955)).
As late as the 1950s, a Nevada trial court granted a defendant-doctor’s
motion to dismiss even though the plaintiff-patient maintained that the doctor
deliberately deceived her into consenting. See Corn, 289 P.2d at 281–82 (noting
trial court’s grant of involuntary dismissal and plaintiff’s assignments of error).
There, Ruth Corn visited Dr. James French about a lump under her right
breast. Id. at 174–75. Suspecting breast cancer, Dr. French indicated that the
breast may need to be removed and began making arrangements over the phone
for a procedure at a hospital, including a request for particular tools. Id. Ruth
immediately told Dr. French, “If that’s my breast you are talking about, you are
not going to remove it.” Id. at 175. Doctor French responded, “I have no
intentions of removing your breast. I wouldn’t think of doing so without first
making a test,” explaining that the test required the same tools. Id. When Ruth
arrived at the hospital for the procedure, she signed a form “giv[ing] [her]
consent to James B. French, M.D., to perform an operation for mastectomy . . .
upon [her], and to do whatever may be deemed necessary in his judgment.” Id.
Ruth had never heard of a mastectomy and Dr. French never explained what
mastectomy meant. Id. Ruth told Dr. French a second time that he only was to
conduct a test. Dr. French removed Ruth’s breast anyway. Id. Although the
Supreme Court of Nevada ultimately reversed the decision and remanded it for
a new trial on a claim of negligence, id. at 182, the trial court’s decision
exemplifies the historical resistance to imposing duties of informed consent.
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University Board of Trustees,153 a California appellate court
imposed on doctors an affirmative duty of honest and meaningful
disclosure.154 Fleshing out the contours of informed consent, the
Salgo court noted that “[a] physician violates his duty to his
patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by
the patient to the proposed treatment.”155
A. Two Approaches to Informed Consent
Today, as a result of judicial decisions or state legislation, all
fifty states require physicians to secure informed consent.156 But
states differ in how they determine what must be disclosed to
patients.157 Under the earliest test, the professional standard,
physicians must disclose only that “which a reasonable medical
practitioner would [disclose] under the same or similar
circumstances.”158 This standard offered physicians, as a group,
the freedom to define appropriate disclosure based on medical
knowledge,159 giving them considerable certainty about what
needed to be disclosed.160 Clearly, the professional standard gives
physician’s substantial control over what is disclosed and,
153. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
154. See id. at 181 (noting that despite this duty, the trial court’s jury
instruction on the physician’s duty to disclose was “rather broad” and explaining
the duty in detail).
155. Id.
156. See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed
Consent: The Case for Shared Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 493
(2006) (providing appendix of state laws and key cases).
157. See BERG ET AL., supra note 149, at 46–51 (discussing the differences
between the “professional” and “patient-oriented” standards of informed
consent). “[I]n practice the boundary between these two standards is often
blurred.” Id. at 52.
158. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
159. See BERG ET AL., supra note 148, at 46 (recognizing the “maintenance of
the medical profession’s freedom . . . to shape the contours of appropriate
disclosure” as an advantage of the professional standard).
160. Id. at 46–47 (noting that “the professional standard places no extra
burden on physicians to conform to an externally imposed standard, since they
presumably already know about and observe professional norms,” but there may
be instances in which no “professional custom of disclosing,” or an inadequate
custom, exists).
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therefore, over the ultimate decision whether to proceed with a
treatment.161 Roughly half the states continue to follow this
standard.162
The more patient-centered material risk standard emerged to
“safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving his own
determination on treatment.”163 The material risk standard
generally requires the physician “to disclose all information about
a proposed treatment that a reasonable person in the patient’s
circumstances would find material to a decision either to undergo
or forgo treatment.”164 Although the material risk standard
imposes a significantly greater burden on physicians,165
“[i]ndividuals place different values on health, medical care, and
risk,” preferences that “physicians cannot accurately predict.”166
161. See id. at 47 (“[E]ven where professional standards exist, they may be
set too low to satisfy the needs of patients who wish to participate in medical
decision making in accord with the idea of informed consent.”).
162. See David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent
Law: Two Standards for Disclosures of Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 103, 105 (2007) (noting that “23 states have maintained the professional
standard”).
163. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(explaining why the court declined to adopt a standard for disclosure “framed
with reference to prevailing fashion within the medical profession” and instead
defined the contours of what is disclosed by “the patient’s right of self-decision”).
164. BERG ET AL., supra note 149, at 48. A handful of jurisdictions “take an
even more protective approach, requiring disclosure of information that a
particular patient (as contrasted with a [reasonable] patient) would have
wanted to make his or her decision.” HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS
204 (7th ed. 2007). Clearly, what the reasonable person finds material and what
an individual patient finds material may differ. Berg offers the example of a
watch repairer who would be interested in knowing that a particular medication
can cause a fine tremor, a risk most patients may not find material. See BERG ET
AL., supra note 149, at 50.
165. This is especially true when the law requires physicians to divine what
individual patients would want to know. See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent
and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 596 (2000)
(arguing that “physicians [should] reasonably inquire about the subjective
treatment goals of patients” and that “[w]ithout an objective limitation to a
physician’s inquiry, physicians could be held liable for failing to ask the one
question that, in hindsight, would have brought forth key information about the
patient’s treatment goals”); see also LO, supra note 149, at 24 (discussing how
problematic a subjective standard is in malpractice litigation).
166. Id. at 20. Over the last decade, healthcare professionals have embraced
a model of shared decision making, which some describe as the “process of
interacting with patients who wish to be involved in arriving at an informed,
values-based choice among two or more medically reasonable alternatives.”
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Under both standards for disclosure, patients must be
informed of “the nature of the intervention, the expected benefits,
the risks, and the likely consequences.”167 Under both, physicians
have a duty to apprise patients of alternatives to treatment,168 as
well as the risk of “doing nothing.”169 Under both, physicians are
not absolved of a duty to discuss the risks of a medication with
patients even if those risks are disclosed on a drug’s labeling. The
drug’s label is intended for consumption by the physician, who
must independently explain its importance to patients.170
Annette O’Connor, Hilary A. Llewellyn-Thomas & Ann Barry Flood, Modifying
Unwarranted Variations in Health Care: Shared Decision Making Using Patient
Decision Aids, HEALTH AFFAIRS 63, 64 (2004), http://geiselmed.dartmouth.edu/
cfm/education/PDF/shared_decision_making.pdf. One impetus for the model is
studies showing while that a significant number of patients (a fourth in one
study) want physicians to make the decision for them, a significant majority,
roughly one-half in one study and 68% in another, wanted to select the
treatment option together with their physician. Deber RB, Kraetschmer N,
Irvine J., What Role Do Patients Wish to Play in Treatment Decision-Making?,
154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1414, 1414–20 (1996); see also Dennis J. Mazur &
David H. Hickam, Patients’ Preferences for Risk Disclosure and Role in Decision
Making for Invasive Medical Procedures, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 114, 115
(1997) (studying patient attitudes about the role they desire to have in medical
decision-making). For a critique of shared decision making, arguing that “the
skimpiest reflection reveals that [shared decision making] is ambiguous unto
incoherence,” see Carl E. Schneider, Void for Vagueness, 37 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
10, 10–11 (2007); see also Simon N. Whitney et al., Beyond Shared Decision
Making: An Expanded Typology of Medical Decisions, 28 MED. DECISION MAKING
699, 701–02 (2008) (discussing situations in which one viable treatment option
exists and contrasting these with situations in which patients and doctors
disagree about treatment options).
167. See LO, supra note 149, at 21 (laying out requirements for informed
consent).
168. See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice:
Liability for Failure of Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of
Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R.4th 900 (originally published in 1985)
(collecting and discussing physician liability for failing to disclose alternative
methods of treatment to patients under both standards).
169. See Wecker v. Amend, 918 P.2d 658, 661 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996)
(concluding that a physician should inform a patient of the option of forgoing
treatment “in situations where no treatment at all is a reasonably medically
acceptable option” under the professional standard); Truman v. Thomas, 611
P.2d 902, 906–07 (Cal. 1980) (explaining that “if the recommended test or
treatment is itself risky, then the physician should always explain the potential
consequences of declining to follow the recommended course of action” since it
would be material to a reasonable patient).
170. See Niemiera ex rel. Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1119 (N.J.
1989) (holding a prescription drug maker did not owe a duty to warn of side-
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Under both, physicians must disclose not only “biomedical
risks” but “psychosocial” harms as well.171 Indeed, sometimes the
psychosocial harms are the ones that matter most. As the medical
ethicist Bernard Lo notes: “[For HIV] and genetic testing, the
pertinent risks are not the risks of venipuncture, but the risks of
stigma and discrimination in employment or health insurance.
Many states have enacted special provisions requiring written
informed consent and pretest counseling for HIV testing.”172
Neither standard, however, requires physicians to inform patients
of things that patients already know or reasonably should know.173
effects because of the “learned intermediary” doctrine and noting that “[t]he
duty of the manufacturer of the vaccine is to warn the learned intermediary who
passes it on to the patient through informed consent” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
171. See LO, supra note 148, at 21 (explaining the types of information
physicians must discuss with patients to obtain informed consent). Some
question whether the information provided to women, or all patients, should be
limited to medical information. For example, family practitioners might choose
to disclose to women risks to their children from cohabiting with someone other
than the child’s legal parent. For a discussion of risks to children cohabiting
with mother’s boyfriends, in particular, see generally Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De
Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, in
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPALS OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 90 (Robin Fretwell
Wilson ed., 2006); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual
Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REVIEW 251
(2001).
172. LO, supra note 148, at 21 (citation omitted).
173. Physicians may also be excused “from a duty to disclose information
concerning dangers related to proposed treatment of which patients of average
sophistication would already be aware, apparently without a requirement that
any given patient actually be ‘of average sophistication.’” Jones, supra note 148,
393–94 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Five
general exceptions exist to the duty to provide informed consent: “threats to
public health, medical emergency, therapeutic privilege, waiver of informed
consent by the patient, and a patient’s lack of competence to make decisions.”
THOMAS MAY, BIOETHICS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF
BIOETHICS DECISION MAKING 21 (paperback ed. 2009). Today, the therapeutic
privilege has fallen into disfavor as too easily leveraged to “overrid[e] a patient’s
values.” Id. at 21–22, 26–30 (explaining how the therapeutic privilege was relied
upon to preclude disclosure of alternative treatments to patients who would
rather let the doctor decide); see also Nathan A. Bostick, Robert Sade, John W.
McMahon & Regina Benjamin, Report of the American Medical Association
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs: Withholding Information from Patients:
Rethinking the Propriety of “Therapeutic Privilege,” 17 THE J. OF CLINICAL
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In short, then, “all risks potentially affecting the decision must be
unmasked.”174
B. Abortion Cases
A pair of recent cases brought by women after abortions they
later regretted affirms that, under both standards, patients must
be informed about factual information like gestational stage.
In the past few years, state courts in New Jersey and Illinois
have grappled with the limits of disclosure provided to women
seeking an abortion. In both, the plaintiffs lost.175 The plaintiffs
maintained—in virtually identical terms176—that they should

ETHICS 302 (2006) (concluding that withholding information is unethical and
early communication should only be avoided if early communication is “clearly
contraindicated”).
174. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote
omitted). Of course, disclosure does not always work this way on the ground. See
BERG ET AL., supra note 148, at 147 (noting that some proponents of informed
consent “are troubled by the failure of the current law to protect [patient]
autonomy as fully as it might and by what they see as a consistent pattern of
subordinating patient autonomy to the interests of the medical profession”
(endnotes omitted)).
175. See Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 574 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2011) (affirming lower court’s dismissal of complaint that included
claim for lack of informed consent); Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 428 (N.J.
2007) (“We . . . reinstate the order dismissing plaintiff’s lack-of-informed-consent
and emotional distress claims, which were the only remaining claims in this
case.”).
To succeed on a claim of a breach of the duty to provide informed consent,
plaintiffs must demonstrate three elements: failure to disclose a specific risk in
violation of the applicable standard, the materialization of the specific risk, and
that had the risk been disclosed, the patient, or a prudent person in the
patient’s position, would not have proceeded as she did. See HALL ET AL, supra
note 164, at 215 (laying out elements of a cause of action for nondisclosure).
On causation, the dominant standard is the prudent person standard, but a
handful of jurisdictions follow a subjective standard. Compare Canterbury, 464
F.2d at 791 (establishing the objective “reasonable person” test for causation
and noting that “[t]he [particular] patient’s testimony is relevant on that score
of course but it would not threaten to dominate the findings”), with Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (rejecting the Canterbury “‘reasonable
man’ standard” and opting instead for a test that places significant weight on
the testimony of the particular patient).
176. The striking parallels between the plaintiffs’ complaints are not
surprising because both cases were brought by the same counsel. See Doe, 956
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have been told the procedure would terminate a “complete,
separate, unique and irreplaceable human being,” and so would
“kill[] an existing human being.”177
In Acuna v. Turkish,178 the court accepted as true the
plaintiff’s allegations that she had asked whether it was a “baby
in there.”179 In Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chicago Area,180
plaintiff alleged she asked if a “life of a human being in the
biological sense” would be terminated.181 In both, the patients
said the provider assured them that no life was at stake. In
Acuna, the doctor allegedly said “don’t be stupid, its only
blood,”182 and in Doe, plaintiff alleged Planned Parenthood’s
counselor told her that “an abortion did not terminate the life of a
human being.”183 Both later learned, as Acuna says in her words,
that there “‘was a baby and not just blood’ inside of her.”184 Both
wanted to be told far more than they say they were—in extremely
explicit terms. Acuna claimed that the physician failed to inform
her that “[Andres] Acuna [(The name she gave to her terminated
“child”)], although a person unborn, was a complete, separate,
unique[,] and irreplaceable human being.”185 Doe charged that
N.E.2d at 571 (“The remarkable similarity with the instant case may be
explained by the statement at oral argument of plaintiff’s counsel that he
represented Acuna before the New Jersey Supreme Court.”)
177. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 418 (internal quotations omitted).
178. 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007).
179. Id. at 419.
180. 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
181. Id. at 567.
182. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 419. “Defendant could not recall how he responded
but believes he likely would have told her that a ‘seven-week pregnancy is not a
living human being,’ but rather it ‘is just tissue at this time.’” Id.
183. Doe, 956 N.E.2d at 567. It is unclear whether the defendant disputes
this allegation. See id. (accepting the plaintiff’s facts as true). The plaintiff
further contended “the defendants had a duty to inform her there is a greater
risk of death, depression, suicide and breast cancer in women who undergo an
abortion than in those who give birth.” Id.
184. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 419 (N.J. 2007). Acuna says that after
experiencing vaginal bleeding as the result of “incomplete abortion,” a nurse told
her that “the doctor had left parts of the baby inside of her.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
185. Id. at 420. Acuna also claimed the physician failed to inform her that
. . . (2) there existed the potential risk that Andres “was capable of
experiencing pain” at eight weeks gestation; (3) abortion involved
“actually killing an existing human being”; (4) she would be at risk of
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Planned Parenthood failed to “inform her that an abortion
‘procedure would terminate the life of a second patient, a living
human being as a matter of biological fact.’”186
Both courts made short work of the duty to be so explicit. In
Acuna, the court first noted that the plaintiff “must demonstrate
that a physician withheld medical information that a reasonably
prudent pregnant woman in like circumstances would have
considered material before consenting to a termination of
pregnancy.”187
The court held it would “not place a duty on doctors when
there is no consensus in the medical community or among the
public supporting plaintiff’s assertions.”188 Indeed, “the
knowledge that plaintiff sought from defendant cannot be
compelled from a doctor who may have a different scientific,
moral, or philosophical viewpoint on the issue of when life
begins.”189 The court refused to use “the engine of the common
law” to “drive public policy in one particular direction” on an
issue on which there is a “deep societal and philosophical divide:”
“the profound issue of when life begins.”190 The common law
requires that physicians “provide their pregnant patients seeking
an abortion only with material medical information, including
gestational stage and medical risks.”191
Evaluating Planned Parenthood’s disclosures by “that of the
reasonable physician,”192 the Doe court also rejected the patient’s
suffering from “post-abortion syndrome,” a form of a post-traumatic
stress disorder; and (5) she would come to realize that she “was
responsible for killing her own child” and bear a weight of guilt for
the rest of her life.
Id.
186. Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011).
187. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 425 (citation omitted).
188. Id. at 428.
189. Id. The defendant and amici argued: “[M]andating that a physician
express a non-medical and value-laden viewpoint conflicting with the
physician’s own strongly held personal and moral beliefs violates his First
Amendment right to the exercise of free—not coerced—speech.” Id.
190. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 427 (N.J. 2007).
191. Id. at 427–28.
192. Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) (citing Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)).
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informed consent claim.193 It cited the Acuna court’s description
of the common law with approval, namely that it “requires
doctors to provide their pregnant patients seeking an abortion
only with material medical information, including gestational
stage and medical risks involved in the procedure.”194 It added
that “[n]o court, regardless of where it sits, has found a common
law duty requiring doctors to tell their pregnant patients that
aborting an embryo, or fetus, is the killing of an existing human
being.”195 The court then rejected the “plaintiff’s claims that the
defendants owed her disclosures under Illinois common law that
reflected something other than the scientific, moral, or
philosophical viewpoint of Planned Parenthood as an abortion
clinic.”196
C. The Disclosure Owed to Women
As these cases illustrate, a sensible line can be drawn
between disclosure of factual medical information that would be
material to the prudent patient, as the Acuna court did, and
weighing in on the ultimate issue of when life begins. In this
context, doctors owe women factual disclosures faithful to the
science around EC. Physicians should give each woman specific,
fact-based information on when a given form of EC likely works
(pre-fertilization, post-fertilization but pre-implantation, or
during implantation) so that she can make decisions based on her
own views of when life begins—or whether that question even
matters to her.
The juncture at which EC works is material to many
patients. Ordinary women care deeply about how EC functions.
Likewise, medical providers—from family practitioners and
members of the FDA scientific panel to academic researchers and
women’s health educators—recognize that women should be told
far more than they are told now.197 The need for factual
193. See id. at 573 (“Illinois common law does not compel the disclosures the
plaintiff claims should have been made to her . . . .”).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 572 (citing Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. 2007)).
196. Id. at 573.
197. Supra Part IV.
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information is especially compelling because many women labor
under misconceptions about how EC functions. Without better
information, some women will make choices that may
“inadvertently violat[e] their own religious or moral values.”198
Of equal force is the fact that some women will choose not to
use EC,199 believing all forms of EC work after fertilization—
when, for Plan B, that is highly unlikely. In one study of “neverusers” of EC in Canada, researchers found that “[n]ever-users
who had believed [EC] to be an abortifacient said that they would
be more likely to consider using it, if the need arose, now that
they understood how it functions.”200
Nonetheless, concerns about compelled speech need to be
taken seriously. Doctors cannot—and should not—be compelled
to express an ultimate conclusion about whether “pregnancy” or
“life” begins at one junction or another. Conversely, doctors
should not be asked to express an opinion on the ultimate
decision of whether a given drug acts as an “abortifacient.” As the
Acuna court noted, “it would be bad public policy, and probably
unconstitutional, under the banner of the law of informed
consent, to compel obstetricians to voice plaintiff’s non-medical
and ideologically-driven viewpoint in the ongoing debate on
abortion.”201 Both courts made clear, however, that factual,
scientific disclosure required by the duty to provide informed
consent does comport with the First Amendment.
D. Practical Considerations

198. Lockwood, supra note 19, at 15.
199. Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 300
(arguing that “an increased knowledge about the mechanisms of action and
safety of EC is essential for the development of new methods as well as for
optimizing the use of those already available”). “This knowledge may also
influence individual and cultural acceptability of EC use.” Id. Another article
argues that in order “[t]o make an informed choice, women must know that
[EC] . . . prevent[s] pregnancy primarily by delaying or inhibiting ovulation and
inhibiting fertilization.” Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7.
200. Jean Shoveller et al., Identifying Barriers to Emergency Contraception
Use Among Young Women from Various Sociocultural Groups in British
Columbia, Canada, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 13, 16 (2007).
201. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 424.
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The aspiration for informed consent, as guidance to federal
family planning agencies under Title X encapsulates the duty, is
to have “individualized dialogue[s] with a client.”202 In the fastpaced medical practices of today, physicians sometimes see
informed consent as a “nuisance.” The impulse may be to deal
with it “in relatively mechanical ways, such as making sure
patients sign consent forms before major procedures.”203
Paper consent is not likely to advance women’s
understanding.204 As many have recognized, patients are no more
likely to read long consent forms than they are to read the FDA
insert. And unless explained in more accessible, nonspecialized
terms, patients are no more likely to understand the content of a
consent form without a physician’s guidance than they are the
FDA label.
True, providing informed consent is not without costs.205
Doctors face enormous time constraints in daily practice.206
202. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR
PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES 18 (2001), http://www.hhs.
gov/opa/pdfs/2001-ofp-guidelines-complete.pdf.
203. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (3d ed. 1989).
204. A rich literature exists on the failings of paper consent. See e.g., Carl E.
Schneider, Void for Vagueness, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 11 (2007) (“The longstanding principle—informed consent—is administratively practical but a paper
tiger.”).
205. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899,
904 (1994) (footnotes omitted)
The realists—primarily practicing physicians—harbor a different
vision of informed consent. Although they emphatically do not contest
the principle and goals of informed consent, they do question whether
most patients really desire the kind of dialogue that the idealists
propose. They also question whether, whatever patients desire, the
gains in patient autonomy and improved outcomes produced by the
dialogue are worth the additional time, money, and needless patient
anxiety and confusion that informed consent may entail.
206. See generally Andrew Gottschalk & Susan A. Flocke, Time Spent in
Face-to-Face Patient Care and Work Outside the Examination Room, 3 ANNALS
FAM. MED. 488 (2005); David Mechanic, Physician Discontent Challenges and
Opportunities, 7 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 941 (2003); Jerome P. Kassirer, Doctor
Discontent, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1543 (1998).
For example, as of 1997, 41% of physicians reported a decrease in the
amount of time devoted to face-time with patients. KAREN SCOTT COLLINS, CATHY
SCHOEN & DAVID R. SANDMAN, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND SURVEY OF PHYSICIAN EXPERIENCES WITH MANAGED CARE 5 (1997). While

EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVES

1425

Mounting administrative responsibilities tied to navigating
payment by insurers, like authorization requests and utilization
review, take time away from interaction with patients.207
Moreover, keeping up with the dense literature on mechanisms of
action of various forms of EC takes time, and demystifying it for
patients will take more time. In the best of circumstances,
patients often do not understand what a physician means.208
Here, easy-to-follow summaries by the Cleveland Clinic and
others can facilitate these conversations, making conversations
less taxing for all. Doctors need only give a snapshot of the
literature drawn from quick summaries of the maturing evidence
about how Plan B and ella work.209
many say that “visit rates above three to four per hour are associated with
suboptimal visit content,” in the U.S., visit lengths were “10 to 20 minutes or
more” in 1999, and are likely more crunched today. See David C. Dugdale,
Ronald Epstein & Steven Z. Pantilat, Time and the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S34, S34 (1999) (“[I]n Great Britain,
average visit lengths for general practitioners are between 5 and 8 minutes,
whereas in the United States and Sweden, they are 10 to 20 minutes or more.”).
207. See David C. Dugdale, Ronald Epstein & Steven Z. Pantilat, Time and
the Patient-Physician Relationship, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S34, S34 (1999)
(“[P]hysicians face mounting demands on their time. Increasing administrative
requirements for health care delivery (e.g., service and authorization requests,
utilization review processes) encroach on time spent with patients.”).
208. See, e.g., Pauline W. Chen, Do You Know What Your Doctor Is Talking
About?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/health/
02chen.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (discussing the problems presented by
patients’ lack of health literacy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2013) (arguing that “mandated
disclosure . . . chronically fails to accomplish its purpose” of enlightening
patients so that they can participate meaningfully in decision-making processes
with professionals).
209. Physicians’ prescribing of EC to patients may change with updated
information, as well. Some physicians hesitate to prescribe EC on religious
grounds. See Jennifer L. Wallace et al., Emergency Contraception: Knowledge
and Attitudes of Family Providers, 36 FAM. MED. 417, 421 (2004) (identifying a
“subset of physicians who would not prescribe under any circumstance . . .
[because of] feeling uncomfortable with EC secondary to religious/ethical
beliefs”). This reluctance may be allayed as to Plan B with better information.
See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing how Plan B works). Citing a “lack of
knowledge,” physicians are understandably hesitant to prescribe to adolescents.
Neville H. Golden et al., Emergency Contraception: Pediatricians’ Knowledge,
Attitudes, and Opinions, 107 PEDIATRICS 287, 291 (2001). In 2001, “most
pediatricians did not feel comfortable prescribing EC and cited lack of
knowledge as the main concern for lack of comfort,” although this may have
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Physicians do have to “remember[] to discuss EC during
routine visits,” which is not the easiest thing to do in a crush of
patients and is “one of the most significant barriers” to EC use.210
To some extent, operationalizing informed consent falls not solely
on the doctor but can be facilitated by good practices and good
office staff. Videos and print brochures can introduce the patient
to the needed information, supplementing the interactions
between doctor and patient. Perhaps more for this topic than
most, a visual will go a long way towards illuminating the
junctures at which a particular form of EC may work—whether
(a) before fertilization, (b) after fertilization and before
implantation, or (c) during implantation. A visual would also
assist a woman who did not already have a set notion about when
pregnancy begins to decide, for herself, among competing medical
understandings. In studies of video consent, some patients better
understand and are more satisfied with their treatments when
medical professionals supplement their verbal interaction with
audio-visual aids.211

changed. Id.
Twelve percent cited moral or religious reasons and [seventeen
percent] were concerned about teratogenic effects. There were no
differences in comfort level based on age, gender, or practice type.
Twenty-two percent of respondents believed that providing EC
encourages adolescent risk-taking behavior and 52.4% would restrict
the number of times they would dispense EC to an individual
[adolescent] patient.
Id. at 287. Better information may again allay physician concerns, an important
benefit since girls need this information as much as women—or perhaps even
more. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 131, at 20–24 (discussing teen
pregnancy and life chances).
210. See Wallace et al., supra note 209, at 421 (discussing “[b]arriers to EC
use identified by physicians”).
211. See Michael Migden, Arianne Chavez-Frazier & Tri Nguyen, The Use of
High Definition Video Modules for Delivery of Informed Consent and Wound
Care Education in the Mohs Surgery Unit, 27 SEMINARS CUTANEOUS MED. &
SURGERY 89, 92 (2008) (“Increased patient understanding was demonstrated in
our assessment of the wound care video group, with patients scoring 91.6% on
the multiple-choice quiz compared with a score of 84% in the group with only
nurse demonstration of wound care.”); E. Tompsett, R. Afifi & S. Tawfeek, Can
Video Aids Increase the Validity of Patient Consent, 32 J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY, 680, 680–82 (2012) (offering evidence that patient understanding
of methods and purpose of treatment was significantly enhanced by using
videos).
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Some states provide legal safe harbor protections that
immunize physicians who follow “stock” disclosures about the
risks of a particular treatment, an approach that could be used
here to reduce the transaction costs of providing informed consent
(as well as liability risks). Texas provides one example of such a
safe harbor protection.212 Texas physicians may use off-the-rack
disclosure forms to provide information to patients about risks
inherent in particular procedures.213 One form is very general and
may be adapted to any procedure.214 Other forms have been
developed for specific procedures, listing their particular risks
and unique concerns.215 The patient signs the form prior to
undergoing treatment. The patient’s signature triggers a legal
presumption that the duty of informed consent was satisfied.216
The form supplements, but does not replace, the discussion that
must occur between physician and patient to otherwise fulfill the
doctor’s disclosure obligations.217
The safe harbor approach, like good office procedures, can
significantly reduce the burden on physicians of meeting their
legal duties to empower women to decide for themselves.
VI. Conclusion
Like so much of the country’s continuing clash over abortion,
the dispute over whether Plan B and ella act as ordinary
contraceptives, before fertilization—or whether they “violate[] the

212. For a general discussion of Texas’s safe harbor protections, see
generally Informed Consent, TEXAS MED. ASS’N (Feb. 2012), http://www.
texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=6049#Proper (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
213. See id. (explaining how and when disclosure forms are used); see also 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 165.6 (2014); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 601.4, 601.5, 601.7,
601.8, 601.9 (2014) (discussing consents and disclosures required in various
procedures).
214. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 601.4, 601.5, 601.7.
215. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 165.6; see also 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 601.4,
601.5, 601.7, 601.8, 601.9 (discussing consents and disclosures required in
various procedures).
216. See Informed Consent, supra note 212 (stating that once risks are
disclosed and consent is given, a legal presumption is established).
217. Id.
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Commandment against murder”218—generates more heat than
light.
Clearly, “women should be informed that the best available
evidence is that the ability of [both to] prevent pregnancy can be
fully accounted for by mechanisms that do not involve
interference with post-fertilization events.”219 While hundreds of
studies over fifteen years demonstrate that the chances that Plan
B ever acts after fertilization are vanishingly small, the same
cannot be said of ella.
While many women have no moral qualms about using EC,
whether it acts before or after fertilization, others do. For them,
the fact that a drug may act after fertilization means that it is
morally off limits. Equipping women with the factual information
necessary for them to make their own moral judgments falls
squarely within the commitment we have made to patients in
matters affecting their bodies and health: patients decide.

218. Complaint at 10, Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402 (W.D.
Penn. 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-00207).
219. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7.

